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WHAT REFERS? HOW? 
Alex Barber 
 
I. Introduction: what refers? 
Guns don’t kill people, people kill people. This National Rifle Association slogan has a 
popular analogue in the philosophy of language: Words don’t refer to things, people refer to 
things. Thus we have Peter Strawson asserting, in his reply to Bertrand Russell, that: 
 
‘referring’… is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can 
use an expression to do. (Strawson 1950: 326) 
 
Echoing him, Leonard Linsky writes: 
 
Of the first importance [in discussions of the reference relation] is the consideration 
that it is the users of language who refer … and not, except in a derivative sense, the 
expression which they use in so doing. (Linsky 1963: 74) 
 
Noam Chomsky cites Strawson in support of a similar-sounding view: 
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The question, “to what does the word X refer?,” has no clear sense… . In general, a 
word, even of the simplest kind, does not pick out an entity of the world, or of our 
“belief space”… . (Chomsky 2000: 181) 
 
James McGilvray, too, criticizes those who: 
 
…think of reference as a conventional relationship between word and world, or perhaps 
even look for a “natural” relationship in a realist construal of information theory; in 
either case, they apparently ignore the fact that people use words (and they use them in 
many ways) to refer to things. (McGilvray 2005: 15; see also McGilvray 1998) 
 
But just as campaigners for gun control persist in talking of the lethal properties of guns, 
many philosophers of language, including W. V. Quine and Nathan Salmon, continue to talk 
of the referential properties of words, conceding only that the identity of these properties must 
sometimes be relativized to a context of utterance. 
 
One thinks of reference, first and foremost, as relating names and other singular terms 
to their objects. (Quine 1990: 27) 
 
[T]he semantic attributes of expressions are not conceptually derivative of the sppech 
acts performed by their utterers, and are [instead] intrinsic to the expressions 
themselves, or to the expressions as expressions of a particular language and as 
occurring in a particular context. (Salmon 2004: 238) 
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And of course, formal semantics, even when cognitivist in orientation, involves the ascription 
of referential properties to expressions:  
 
26 a. Rabbit refers to rabbits.  
…. 
Proper nouns like Jill … are analysed as having persons as their semantic values, that is, 
as referring to those individuals: 
9 a. Val(x, Jill) iff x = Jill. (Larson & Segal 1995: 41, 118) 
 
So what refers, words or people? Perhaps both do. Many, including Saul Kripke and Kent 
Bach, have insisted on the dissociability of two distinct notions of reference: 
 
The speaker’s referent is the thing the speaker referred to by the designator, though it 
may not be the referent of the designator, in his idiolect. (Kripke 1977: 238) 
 
Failing to distinguish speaker reference from linguistic reference … inevitably leads to 
theoretical confusion. (Bach 1987: 6) 
 
Completing the logical space, a fourth possibility is that neither words nor people refer. 
 Rather than launching into an investigation of which of these four possible views is 
correct, it would be as well to ask whether and why it matters how we fill the subject position 
when using the verb ‘to refer’. I take this question up in section II. The rest of the paper 
uncovers then tackles a specific puzzle about the relation between speaker reference and word 
reference. The ingredients of the puzzle are entirely familiar, having to do with the apparent 
intentionality (in senses loosely associated with Brentano) of speaker reference, a trait that 
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word reference seems to lack. In view of this apparent contrast, how could both speakers and 
words refer? The puzzle is introduced in III and firmed up in sections IV-VIII, with a solution 
offered in IX. Part of the firming up process involves explaining how some standard views on 
speaker reference and word reference seem to have led to the puzzle being either overlooked 
or dismissed. 
 
II. What turns on what refers? 
The question of whether it is speakers or words or both or neither that refer could be – and 
clearly often is, tacitly at least – approached naïvely, as a question about proper usage of the 
verb ‘to refer’. But why should we care about the folk’s view on what refers? Folk views 
sometimes constitute useful if crude proto-theories, platforms from which to develop more 
rigorous proposals. That does not seem to be the case here. But in any case, the folk’s opinion 
is unclear. Asking explicitly yields no helpful answer, since the folk are vague in their views 
and easily led away from their initial answer no matter what it may have been. Notice in 
addition that acceptability judgements vary from one linguistic culture to another. As readily 
as English speakers allow that universities educate students, French speakers allow that 
lawnmowers mow lawns, even though this latter is unacceptable to most English ears. Unless 
we aspire only to a parochial theory of reference, there is little to be gained from asking 




 Rather than addressing a semi-interesting question about ordinary usage with no clear 
answer, I will attempt to raise a genuine puzzle about reference by coming at the topic of 
opacity from an unfamiliar angle. Others have had reasons of their own for taking a view on 
whether it is words or speakers that refer. I will summarize two such reasons briefly, below, 




 but because they impinge, obliquely, on what I have to say about the 
puzzle that is my more immediate concern. 
 The essence of Strawson’s point is that if we treat referring as something people can do 
with words, Russell’s theory of descriptions and its corollary, his theory of ordinary names, 
have no purpose. Whenever a person attempts to refer using definite description (perhaps 
disguised as a name), they make, or affect to make, certain presuppositions – that there is a 
unique contextually salient satisfier of the description, for example. They succeed in referring 
only if these presuppositions are met. Russell’s mistake is to confuse the presupposition 
relation, which holds between a speaker and some condition, for an entailment relation, i.e. 
one that holds between the expression used and this same condition. His theory of the logical 
form of descriptions explains this entailment, but if Strawson is right, no such explanation is 
needed. One can utter a definite description in an attempt to refer but fail to refer because 
nothing uniquely satisfies the description. This is no more mysterious than the fact that one 
can, for example, swerve in an attempt to avoid an obstacle but fail because there was no 
obstacle to avoid. Neither calls for a semantic explanation.
3
 
 If referring is indeed something people do with words and not a standing characteristic 
of words, a more general moral one might draw is that attempts to deliver a systematic theory 
of the referential properties of the expressions of a language are misconceived. Referring 
would be an aspect of the use of language rather than of a stable body of knowledge codified 
in the language faculty – an aspect of performance rather than competence as Chomsky would 
once have put it. Ambitions to provide a theory of this use would be as hopeless as 
behaviourist attempts to capture our dispositions to produce particular sounds. Intuitions 
about reference may feed into the explanation of systematic, relatively contained phenomena, 
such as binding relations. But according to Chomsky, McGilvray, and others (e.g. Pietroski 
2003), attempting to construct a theory of reference as philosophers of language tend to use 
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this phrase, in which word-world relations entail a compositional theory of truth for the 
sentences of a language, is the wrong way to set about developing a natural science of 
language. 
 I will remain as neutral as I can on both Strawson’s and Chomsky’s concerns, which are 
broader than my own. But both are connected, tangentially, to the puzzle to which I now turn. 
 
III. A puzzle about reference 
I am interested in the ramifications of an apparent contrast between the characteristics of word 
reference, assuming there is such a thing, and the characteristics of speaker reference, again 
assuming there is such a thing. Given assumptions I will come to, speaker reference is 
arguably intentional in the Brentano sense. That is to say, facts about speaker reference seem 
to respect neither of two logical laws, the law of existential generalization and the law 
identity. Were it a fact that someone had touched Santa Claus, it would follow that Santa 
Claus existed; and from the fact that Hesperus is a planet it would follow that Phosphorus is a 
planet. But from the fact that a person has referred to Santa Claus it does not follow that Santa 
Claus exists; and from the fact that a person has referred to Hesperus it does not follow that 
they have referred to Phosphorus. Word reference, by contrast, and once again given 
assumptions I will come to, is arguably intentional in neither respect: a word cannot refer to 
Santa Claus given that no such person exists, and if a word refers to Hesperus it refers equally 
to Phosphorus. 
 To keep things manageable I will focus exclusively on the failure of the law of identity 
until section IX, at which point I will show that a solution to the version of the puzzle thrown 
up by substitution failure works to solve the version of the puzzle thrown up by failure of 
existential generalization. In the meantime, and in the form of it that I will be focussing on, 
the puzzle arises out of a tension between two claims, I and II below. 
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I. Speaker reference is substitution unfriendly. 
II. Word reference is substitution friendly. 
 
A property (or perhaps, a “property”) is substitution friendly if and only if it always respects 
the law of identity, so that if some object has that property then anything identical with the 
object also has the property. I and II, then, make contrasting claims about whether being 
referred to is among those properties that respect the law of identity: if it is a speaker doing 
the referring, the law is not respected; if it is an expression doing the referring, the law is 
respected. If Jane refers to Hesperus she has, according to I, not necessarily referred to 
Phosphorus, despite their being one and the same planet. By contrast, if ‘Venus’ refers to 
Hesperus then according to II it must also refer to Phosphorus. 
 Let me stress that the puzzle is not simply that I and II are immediately plausible but 
inconsistent with one another. Rather, it is that further claims, which are plausible, 
collectively entail I and II; and that another claim, also plausible, is provably inconsistent with 




Figure 1. The structure of the puzzle. 
 
The puzzle comes to this: five plausible claims – IA, IB, IIA, IIB, and III, none yet stated – 
cannot all be true. I and II merely play a central role in demonstrating that the five claims are 
inconsistent with one another. 
 In this section I will be concerned only with the entailment of I by IA and IB and the 
entailment of II by IIA and IIB (and of course with saying what IA through to IIB are). Only in 
the sections that follow will I be concerned with the alleged inconsistency – arguing for its 
seriousness, and suggesting a solution. 
 Assumption IA is that what a speaker refers to in uttering a word is constitutively 
determined by that speaker’s intention in performing the utterance. There are various forms 
the relevant intention could take. In what follows, I will take IA to be the schematic 
generalization
4
 of which the following is an instance: 
 
Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus if and only if her intention in uttering the word is 















Claims in the dotted box are 
collectively inconsistent 
Claims in the dashed box 










The precise formulation of the intention is not critical. I have adopted this one rather than, 
say, ‘…her intention in uttering the word is to refer to Hesperus’ because intentions, in 
general, must be liable to being acted on unsuccessfully.
5
 Jane could easily fail in her 
intention to be thought of as referring to Hesperus, but if the intention that constituted her 
referring to Hesperus was the intention to refer to Hesperus, her intention would be self-
fulfilling. For all that, there is an unusual connection between the success condition for her 
intention and her intention’s content: to succeed in bringing about what she intends, it is both 
necessary and sufficient that her intention be recognized. In this respect, referring can be 
grouped along with promising, asking, insinuating, and other meaningful acts like depicting, 
and distinguished from other kinds of non-meaningful acts such as kicking or finding. 
Arguably it is a mark of meaningful acts that they belong to some kind k such that one counts 
as having ked if and only if one has acted with the intention of being thought of as having ked 
(where additional characteristics are needed to distinguish meaningful act types from one 
another). IA merely combines this thought about what it is to be meaningful with the platitude 
that for a person to refer is for them to perform a meaningful act. 
 IB is a claim about all intentions, not only semantic ones. Suppose Jane intended to pat 
Rex. It does not follow that she intended to pat Fido, even if Rex and Fido are one and the 
same dog. It may be that she had no idea that Rex and Fido were the same dog. IB, the 
generalization of this, is the claim that intending is substitution unfriendly. Of course, not 
everyone agrees that psychological attitudes are substitution unfriendly. I discuss their views 
in section VIII. At this stage I am merely attempting to make good the dialectic of Figure 1, 
and it is enough that many would find IB plausible. If we apply IB to the intentions found in IA, 
I follows: speaker reference is substitution-unfriendly. This result is not peculiar to my 
idiosyncratic formulation of the intention that constitutes someone having referred to 
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something. The same conclusion is invited by any formulation instances of which name or 
idiosyncratically describe the referent inside the scope of ‘intends’ or some other 
psychological operator on the right-hand side of the ‘iff’. This or something approaching it 
appears to be a commitment of many existing definitions of speaker reference or related 
notions (see e.g. Kripke 1977: 238; Evans 1982: 318-20;  Bach 1987:52; Barker 2004: 113; 
Davis 2005: 162, 202-3; see also Searle 1969: 94 and the penultimate note of this paper). 
 What about II? Before searching for plausible claims that entail it, it is important to 
distinguish it from a similar sounding but more familiar thesis. Let II’ be the claim that 
licences any inference with the same pattern as the following: 
 
‘Hesperus’ refers to Venus. 
‘Phosphorus’ refers to Venus. 
 ‘…Hesperus…’ is true if and only if ‘…Phosphorus…’. 
 
In other words, according to II’, co-referring expressions of the object language can always be 
substituted salva veritate within sentences of the object language. (There are, of course, some 
widely debated apparent exceptions to this pattern, including attitude reports.) By contrast, the 




‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus. 
Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
 ‘Venus’ refers to Phosphorus. 
 
II’ insists that substitution of one object-language expression for another co-referring object-
language expression does not affect the truth of the object-language sentence within which the 
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substitution is made. II concerns the choice between two co-referring expressions of the 
metalanguage. The two claims are related since II asserts, in effect, that constructing 
sentences using ‘“Venus” refers to…’ does not generate exceptions to II’; but II and II’ are 
distinct for all that. 
 That word reference is substitution friendly follows from IIA and IIB. IIA is the claim that 
the truth-conditional properties of sentences lacking opaque operators are substitution 
friendly. Given that Hesperus is Phosphorus, for example, if ‘Venus is wet’ is true if and only 
if Hesperus is wet, then it is true if and only if Phosphorus is wet. IIB is the converse of 
compositionality. Compositionality (in the sense I am using the expression here) is the thesis 
that there is a function from the referential properties of simple expressions onto the 
referential properties of the complex expressions built out of them. As a special case of this, 
if, for each word within a sentence, the condition is set for an arbitrary entity being that 
word’s referent, then there is no room for manoeuvre on what it would take for that sentence 
to be true. The converse of this, IIB, is that once the condition for a particular sentence being 
true is set, there is no room for manoeuvre on the condition for any expression within it to 
refer to something: change the requirement an object must meet for it to be the referent of any 
word in a given sentence and you will change the range of circumstances in which that 
sentence is true. For example, if a name ‘Nelson’ referred not to Nelson but to Churchill, the 
circumstances under which ‘Nelson was British’ is true would change. 
 The proof of II from IIA and IIB, summarized below, is essentially a matter of showing 
that the substitution friendliness of reference conditions follows from the substitution 




IIA If Hesperus is Phosphorus then the biconditional, that ‘Venus is wet’ is true-iff-
Hesperus is wet iff ‘Venus is wet’ is true-iff-Phosphorus is wet, holds. 
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IIB The biconditional, that ‘Venus is wet’ is true-iff-Hesperus is wet iff it is also true-
iff-Phosphorus is wet, requires the biconditional, that ‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus 
iff it refers to Phosphorus. 
 
 If Hesperus is Phosphorus then ‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus iff it refers to 
Phosphorus. 
 
The conclusion, here, is but an instance of II, but the proof clearly generalizes.
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 Against this supposed demonstration of II one might ask whether the condition for the 
truth of ‘Venus is wet’ really can be expressed using ‘Phosphorus’ in place of ‘Hesperus’ 
(assuming use of the latter were acceptable). After all, the resulting expression of the 
condition differs in meaning, or cognitive significance, from the original one. I will reject this 
response in detail in a later section. At present I am concerned only with making a prima facie 
case for the existence of a puzzle. All the same I will make two related points even here. First, 
if a good case can be made for thinking that meaning, or cognitive significance, is substitution 
unfriendly, then that does not necessarily represent a problem for the view that truth 
conditions are substitution friendly, which is all that IIA demands. It might equally be 
interpreted as a challenge for the simple identification of meaning with truth conditions. 
While meaning and truth conditions are intimately related, their relation is not well captured 
by the slogan that the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition. Second, there is good 
reason to think that the condition for a sentence’s being true is substitution friendly. Were it 
not, we would be forced to re-evaluate our endorsement of the law of identity and the 




 Hesperus is Phosphorus 
 Hesperus is wet iff Phosphorus is wet 
 
 p iff Hesperus is wet 
 Hesperus is wet iff Phosphorus is wet 
 p iff Phosphorus is wet 
 
But if these inferences are legitimate – assuming any grammatical replacement of ‘p’ in the 
second inference – they can be concatenated to legitimize our illustrative instance of IIA (as 
the more detailed proof in the previous note makes clear): 
 
 ‘Venus is wet’ is true iff Hesperus is wet 
 Hesperus = Phosphorus 
 ‘Venus is wet’ is true iff Phosphorus is wet 
 
Unhappiness with this concatenation is likely to spring from claims about what attributions of 
truth conditions are meant to achieve. It may be that they achieve this using ‘Hesperus’ but 
not ‘Phosphorus’. This unhappiness, which springs from a desire to maintain a tight 
connection between truth conditions and meaning, is taken up in section VII. 
 
IV. Interlude: summary so far and sketch of what follows 
I have shown that two claims, I and II, which are in tension though not inconsistent with one 
another, are entailed by four other claims, IA, IB, IIA, and IIB, all of which have some claim to 
plausibility. I will now consider some different ways in which one might be underwhelmed by 
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this tension. Each way corresponds to some stance one might take to the question of whether 
it is words or speakers that refer. All the stances I look at give rise either to resistance to my 
suggestion that there is something to worry about in the alleged tension between I and II, or to 
a failure even to acknowledge this tension. 
 First, a person may agree that there are two notions but insist that, for this very reason, 
there is no tension. I call this position dualism. By not conflating the two kinds of reference, 
e.g. by abandoning the ambiguous expression ‘reference’ entirely and replacing it with two 
terms, one for word reference and another for speaker reference, the so-called tension 
evaporates. Or so dualists will claim. In the next section I argue against dualism by showing 
how a third claim, the ‘III’ of Figure 1, generates an inconsistency between I and II even if 
one keeps the two notions of reference distinct. 
 In contrast, monists maintain that there is in fact only one notion of reference, the 
existence of distinct notions being a readily explicable illusion. If there is only one notion of 
reference, there cannot be a tension between the “two” notions. I respond to monism in 
section VI, first by arguing for its implausibility, and second by showing how the 
inconsistency arises even for monists, albeit in a different form. 
 A third stance, cognitivism, is the topic of section VII. Cognitivists assume that 
attributing referential properties to words is best construed as describing an aspect of a 
speaker’s psychology. If word reference is psychological in this way, it could be as 
substitution unfriendly as speaker reference, and for the same reason. 
 The final source of hostility to seeing anything worth labelling a “puzzle” in the tension 
between I and II takes the form of a disjunctive dilemma. Names refer either directly or 
indirectly. If they refer directly, the tension can be explained by rejecting IB, the claim that 
psychological attitudes are substitution unfriendly. If they refer indirectly, via a description 
that is associated somehow with the name, then other aspects of the argument for the 
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inconsistency become vulnerable. So while we may not know which of the two theories of 
names is correct, the tension is a problem for no one. I consider this disjunctive response in 
section VIII. 
 If I am right that these attempts to trivialize the puzzle all fail, the five propositions are 
inconsistent and we must abandon at least one of them. In section IX I explore the possibility 
that the source of the problem lies with intention-based accounts of speaker reference. I do not 
deny that an acceptable intention-based account of reference is available, but its form must be 
such as to allow that speaker reference is substitution friendly even if intentions are not. I go 
on to suggest such a form. 
 
V. Dualism about reference: two notions, not one? 
I and II taken together sound vaguely paradoxical, but could equally serve as a further 
reminder of the importance Kripke, Bach, and others attach to the distinction between speaker 
reference and word reference. An effective way of maintaining the distinction would be to 
introduce different terms, such as ‘picking out’ for what speakers do and ‘designating’ for 
what words do. This distinction is a real one in at least this: speaker reference (or picking out) 
and word reference (or designating) are dissociable. I may refer to an overbearing sub-Dean 
as ‘Napoleon’, using a word that designates a dead French military leader to pick out a living 
British civilian. Or I may accidentally refer to someone using the name of someone else who I 
had been thinking about moments earlier. 
 The two notions may be distinct, but a puzzle arises anyway if the two notions coincide 
in what I will call normal circumstances. (I will say much more about “normality” shortly.) 
That is, I and II are inconsistent if taken together with III, which is the claim that there is 
normally a symmetry between speaker reference and word reference. 
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III. “The symmetry principle”: In normal circumstances, a speaker refers to whatever 
the word she or he uses refers to. 
 
In other words, for a speaker to refer to something, it is normally both enough and required 
that the word used refers to that thing. If I use the name ‘The Admiral Lord Nelson’, for 
example, then barring performance error, irony, massive ignorance of early 19
th
 century 
European history, and other arguably abnormal factors, I will have referred, not to Napoleon, 
but to Nelson. It is both enough and necessary for me to refer to Nelson that I use a word that 
refers to Nelson. This symmetry is inconsistent with the conjunction of I and II: 
 
The inconsistency of I, II, and III 
Suppose Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus in what, let us suppose, are normal 
circumstances. Did she refer to Phosphorus? The symmetry principle (in one direction) 
tells us that the word she used refers to Hesperus, and hence, by II, that it refers to 
Phosphorus, and hence, by the symmetry principle (in the other direction), that Jane did 
indeed refer to Phosphorus. This shows us that, in normal circumstances anyway, 
speaker reference is substitution friendly, pace I. 
 
Whatever the merits of this argument against dualism, it survives the replacement of ‘Jane 
refers’ and ‘“Venus” refers’ by ‘Jane picks out’ and ‘“Venus” designates’.  Reservations are 
likely to turn, rather, on the qualification in III: ‘In normal circumstances,…’. 
 The most immediate concern is that the inconsistency shown above is not between II, 
III, and I, but between II, III, and the claim that substitution failure in speaker reference can 
occur in normal circumstances. This leaves open the possibility that speaker reference is 
substitution unfriendly, but only in abnormal circumstances. Were that so, the tension 
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Hesperus-Phosphorus cases give rise to could be assimilated to the class of cases in which it is 
known that speaker reference and word reference fail to ride in tandem. 
 Two ways of responding to scepticism about the ‘in normal circumstances’ qualification 
in the anti-dualist argument are available. The first, and probably more promising, would be 
to formulate the demonstration of an inconsistency without using the qualification, perhaps by 
replacing III with something else. I do precisely this in the next section, in the course of 
looking at monism. The second would be to impose more robust constraints on the 
qualification instead of leaving it so vague. These constraints would need to be tight enough 
to render the use of ‘Napoleon’ to refer to a sub-Dean abnormal but liberal enough for 
Hesperus-Phosphorus cases to be classified as normal. 
 Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels contains a clue to how this second option might be pursued. 
Gulliver’s host during his visit to the Grand Academy of Lagado parades before him what are 
in fact parodies of various 18
th
 century scientific and philosophical innovations. Among them 
is a progressive new language, innovative for its lack of words. Gulliver is informed in its 
defence that: 
 
[s]ince Words are only names for Things, it would be more convenient for all Men to 
carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the particular business they 
are to discourse on. (Swift 1726: 76) 
 
‘Speakers’ of this language are weighed down with the objects they wish to ‘talk’ about with 
their colleagues in silent ‘conversations’. The moral of Swift’s satire is that language’s value 
depends on its enabling us to share thoughts about a thing without being contextually tied to 
that thing. By using a word in a thing’s stead we need not carry the thing itself around – and 
need not rely on other heavily contextual cues to enable our interlocutor to figure out what we 
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are referring to. Of course, we can still communicate in a way that does rely on heavily 
contextual cues (including presentation of the referent as a limiting case). When this happens, 
or when the audience must diagnose a performance error in order to identify the referent, a 
speaker may use a word to refer to something other than what the word refers to. But the use 
of a word to refer is normal to the extent that exploiting heavily contextual cues and 
diagnosing performance error are not necessary for the audience to identify the referent. In 
these circumstances, the choice of word does the trick, which is in effect what III is claiming. 
Jane’s using ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus in the course of asserting that Hesperus is wet 
appears to be normal in this (loose but tighter) sense. 
 A lingering worry, here, is that no reason has been given to think that III works in both 
directions. Suppose Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus, in a situation normal enough that 
‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus. By II, ‘Venus’ then also refers to Phosphorus. At this point 
someone could dig their heels in. Perhaps the situation counts as fully normal only if Jane 
knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and because she does not, she has not referred to 
Phosphorus. In less than fully normal circumstances the most we could say is that the word 
Jane uses refers to Phosphorus only if there is something identical to Phosphorus that she has 
referred to. 
 This possibility is hard to reconcile with any plausible account of word reference, 
without which dualism would lack plausibility in any case. I will say more about what the 
options are in the next section, but on a conventionalist account, for example, a word refers to 
that which people regularly use it to refer to. It must be possible for it to be used on different 
occasions and by different people to refer to the same thing known in different ways without 
sabotaging the potential for a convention. If S1 uses W to refer to O1 and O2 without realising 
that O1 and O2 are O3, S2 uses W to refer to O2 and O3 without realising that O2 and O3 are O1, 
and S3 uses W to refer to O3 and O1 without realising that O3 and O1 are O2, that could count 
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as the community of S1…S3 using W in a common enough way for the convention to establish 
itself. It would be peculiar for the convention itself to discriminate in favour of one particular 
speaker’s perspective on the object. All objects admit of a multiplicity of perspectives, but 
why should one particular perspective be definitive of the use defining the convention. More 
plausible (in so far as conventionalism is plausible) would be that all uses from which word 
reference is extrapolated should be thought of as some person or other’s use of the word to 




VI. Monism about reference: one notion, not two? 
If there is only one kind of reference, be it word reference or speaker reference, there can 
hardly be a tension between the contrasting characteristics of two notions of reference, let 
alone a proof along the lines of the previous section of an outright inconsistency. The 
quotations from Quine and Strawson in section I represent opposite strands of this reaction to 
the puzzle. Quine’s view is less widely supported today. Those who accept that a given word 
refers to something tend to require that its doing so depends in some way on people using it or 
having used it to refer to that thing, though perhaps not solely on this. Strawson’s view is 
initially more plausible. According to him and Linsky (and see also Bach 1987: 40), words 
don’t refer at all, save in an entirely derivative sense, and the very question of which two-
place reference relation is the fundamental one – i.e. the two-place relation between words 
and objects or the two-place relation between speakers and objects – is misconceived. Talk of 
words referring or of speakers referring, in each of which reference is superficially a two-
place relation, distorts the nature of the three-place relation that reference really is, i.e. a 
matter of a speakerI using a wordII to refer to an objectIII.
8
 The NRA slogan arguably exploits a 
parallel confusion: it is not that gunsI kill peopleII, or that peopleI kill peopleII. Rather, peopleI 
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use gunsII to kill peopleIII. The use of distinct shorthands, in each of which the three-place 
relation appears to be two-place, creates the illusion of a substantial debate.
 9
 
 In what follows I will, first, offer a reason for being suspicious of this form of monism. 
But for those who find this reason unpersuasive I will go on to present a monist-friendly 
version of the puzzle: an inconsistency similar to that of the previous section but reached 
without the assumption that words refer (or designate, etc.). 
 To begin, then, why is the view that only speakers refer implausible? The answer 
springs out of an intention-based account of speaker reference along the lines of IA plus two 
plausible psychological assumptions. If what a person refers to is a matter of what they intend 
to be thought of as referring to, they can refer only if they can form the relevant intention. But 
forming intentions requires an expectation of success. Right now, for example, I am not in a 
position to leap to the moon, and because I know this I cannot even form the intention to leap 
to the moon. To form that intention, I would need to believe that leaping to the moon is 
possible. I cannot simply choose to believe this, since belief formation is itself subject to a 
psychological requirement: that one have some evidence in favour of the proposition to be 
believed. These two principles – expectation of success as a requirement on intention 
formation, and evidence as a requirement on belief formation – taken together with IA mean 
that I can only refer if I have some reason to think that I will be recognized as having referred. 
In some circumstances this condition will be met even in the absence of any stable relation 
between word and referent. (That performance errors do not always sabotage communication 
is proof of this – for instance, someone may refer to someone called Paul using ‘Peter’ 
without the audience being misled as to who was referred to, perhaps because they can see the 
speaker looking straight at a known Paul, or because, even when this Paul is absent from the 
conversational arena, the speaker attributes to the person she calls ‘Peter’ a number of 
properties that could only plausibly be ascribed to the Paul.) But in other circumstances, those 
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I hesitatingly labelled ‘normal’ in the previous section, more is required. What this more 
comes can be left open here, since any spelling out is likely to yield a notion of word 
reference that is distinct from speaker reference. A traditional understanding of the extra 
requirement is that of a convention relating the word’s sound to the speaker’s referent. The 
existence of such a convention would, in that case, constitute the word’s having the referent it 
does. Others, sceptical of the explanatory potential of conventions, assume instead merely a 
stable association in the speaker’s psychology between the word they use and the object they 
refer to (see Laurence 1996, Mercier 2003). What constitutes a word’s referring to what it 
does refer to will, in that case, be defined in terms of such stable associations. 
Conventionalism and cognitivism (as I will call the second view) both require that, in normal 
contexts at least, speaker’s can refer only if words refer, contrary to monism 
 A critic of this argument could point to live controversy surrounding both psychological 
assumptions. Against the expectation requirement on intention formation, for example, it does 
not seem implausible that many first-world war soldiers who fired their decrepit rifles across 
no-man’s-land could have done so with the intention of hitting someone, despite their having 
little reason to expect success. Structurally similar cases involving lottery tickets have given 
rise to the so-called lottery paradox. There are linguistic instances, too: addressing people in 
English while travelling outside English-speaking countries can have a vanishingly small 
chance of success, but one often attempts it before resorting to arm-waving. On the other hand 
there does seem to be a psychological block to forming the intention to jump to the moon, and 
an obvious sense in which such a block would be adaptive. There is also a clear selective 
advantage to forming only beliefs for which one has evidence.
10
 This has not prevented some 
– doxastic voluntarists – from rejecting the second psychological assumption used in the 
argument above. Here is no place to try to settle these disputes. I will therefore only reiterate 
that both are highly plausible for many cases and have clear selective advantages, and express 
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the hope that troublesome cases can be assimilated in a way that does not threaten their use in 
the argument against monism.
11
 
 A second line of response to the anti-monist argument springs from the thought that 
word reference is ultimately definable in terms of established usage, or beliefs about 
established usage or potential usability, or something along those lines. If some such 
definition is available, so that the notion of word reference can be reduced to that of speaker 
reference, can’t we say that there is only one notion after all? The difficulty with this response 
is that, even if the inconsistency does not threaten the very prospects for a reduction, the fact 
that there is only one fundamental notion of reference – in the sense that all other relevant 
notions of reference reduce to it – does not mean there is only one notion of reference. 
Average height in a population can be defined in terms of, and hence reduces to, the notion of 
the height of an individual. It does not follow that they are the same notion. Likewise, that 
word reference could be defined in terms of speaker reference would not show that word 
reference has speaker reference’s characteristics. It would still be possible in principle for that 
latter to be substitution friendly while the former is not. 
 A final reservation over the argument calls for a more serious response. Someone could 
insist that a motley conglomeration of mental states underpin our semantic abilities, including 
knowledge of the world, syntactic competence, and ad hoc on-the-hoof reactions to specific 
utterances. Nowhere in this mélange should we expect to find knowledge of, or belief in, a 
stable association between words and things. No contribution is made to the explanation of 
linguistic practice by such an association. On such a view, semantics as traditionally 
conceived – a substantial discipline sitting between syntax and pragmatics and dedicated to 
tracing word-world relations – withers away, along with the notion of word reference that is 
essential to the generation of the puzzle in the previous section. This is the view highlighted at 
the end of section II and associated with Chomsky among others (e.g. McGilvray 1998: 228). 
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For those sympathetic to this view, and indeed to anyone unhappy with the anti-monist 
argument just given, what follows is a monist-friendly version of the puzzle. 
 Even if words do not refer (in a sense that is even moderately invariant over contexts), 
allowing that speakers can use words to refer commits one to the mental equivalent of 
referring words. Following tradition, call these entities mental representations. The 
inconsistency reached in section V can be generated in a different form, couched in terms of 
the characteristics of the referential properties of mental representations rather than of words. 
 In expressing an opinion about something on a particular occasion I may use a word to 
refer to it. I may never have used, and never again use, this same word to this same referential 
end, and it may be that no one else uses this word to refer to this thing, either. Still, I will be 
able to do this only if I have a mental representation of the entity I have referred to. My 
utterance of the word invokes this mental representation, which is to say that the mental 
representation is tokened as part of the intention that constitutes the speaker’s having referred 
using the word. This mental representation has referential properties of its own, a fact that is 
intimately connected to my ability to refer when I use a word that invokes it. This intimate 
connection can be captured in III*, a modified version of III. 
 
III*. “The symmetry principle*”: When a speaker refers using a word, she refers to 
whatever is referred to by the mental representation invoked by her utterance of 
that word. 
 
That is, for a speaker to refer to something, it is enough and it is required that the word used 
invokes a mental representation referring to that thing. Using this to reach an inconsistency 
between speaker reference and mental-representation reference, requires updating II into II*: 
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II*. Mental-representation reference is substitution-friendly. 
 
In other words, if Jane’s mental representation refers to Hesperus, then it also refers to 
Phosphorus given that Hesperus is Phosphorus – whether Jane realizes this or not. 
 II* follows from suitably modified versions of IIA and IIB. IIA held that the truth 
conditions of sentences are substitution friendly. IIA* holds that complex mental 
representations with truth conditions are substitution friendly. Given that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, if p, a mental representation, is true iff Hesperus is wet, then it is also true iff 
Phosphorus is wet. Denial of this would be hard to reconcile with the congruence of 
satisfaction conditions across a wide range of attitudes, including believing, desiring, and 
intending. It may be possible to hold the belief that polenta is yellow without holding the 
belief that cornmeal is yellow, but given that polenta is cornmeal, the belief that polenta is 
yellow will be correct if and only if the belief that cornmeal is yellow is correct. Similarly, 
while it may be possible to intend to pat Fido without intending to pat Rex, the fact that Rex is 
Fido means that any intention to pat Fido will be successfully acted upon if, and only if, the 
intention to pat Rex is successfully acted upon. Finally, while it may be possible to desire that 
Superman takes you out on a date without desiring that Clark Kent takes you out on a date, 
the fact that Clark Kent is Superman means that the desire to be taken out on a date by 
Superman will be met when, and only when, the desire to be taken out on a date by Clark 
Kent is met. 
 IIB held that a difference in the reference conditions for a word gives rise to a difference 
in the truth conditions of any sentence in which the word appears. IIB* holds that a difference 
in the referential properties of a mental representation gives rise to a difference in the truth 
conditions of complex mental representations containing the first mental representation. This 
is highly plausible. For example, if mental representation C referred to Napoleon not Nelson, 
 25 
a belief containing C would be correct according to whether something was true of Napoleon, 
not according to whether it was true of Nelson. The proof of II* from IIA* and IIB* is 
essentially the same as the one set out in section III. 
 Now, finally, we are in a position to prove the inconsistency: 
 
The inconsistency of I, II*, and III* 
Suppose that Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus. Using II* and III*, it is possible to 
show, contrary to I (given the arbitrariness of the example), that she referred to 
Phosphorus. For in referring using ‘Venus’ she will have invoked a mental 
representation, call it V, that (by III*) refers to Hesperus. But from this and II* (and the 
fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus) it follows that V refers to Phosphorus. By III* (again) 
she has, therefore, referred to Phosphorus. 
 
Jane may well have two mental representations, both of which refer to Hesperus/Phosphorus 
but only one of which is invoked by her utterance of ‘Venus’. But this is irrelevant to the 
demonstration of an inconsistency. It challenges neither the premises nor any step of the 
argument based on them. 
 This new version of the puzzle improves on the old one in several respects. For a start, it 
makes no assumption that words refer. This was the initial motive for developing it. In 
addition, because it uses III* in place of III, the symmetry it presupposes is not confined, 
perhaps dubiously, to “normal circumstances”. But then, the new version also introduces what 
some would see as weaknesses. In particular it assumes some version of the representational 
theory of mind. How robust or extensive its commitments are in this respect is hard to say, but 




 Which version of the puzzle one finds more compelling will 
therefore vary according to one’s broader theoretical commitments. 
 
VII. Cognitivism: word reference as a feature of speaker psychology? 
I have looked at two takes on the relation between speaker reference and word reference – 
monism and dualism – and at how they disguise the very existence of the puzzle I am 
interested in. The third stance I wish to consider is really a view on word reference alone, but 
it, too, has the effect of hiding the puzzle. Contrary to II it appears to offer a route to treating 
word reference as substitution unfriendly, just as, according to I, speaker reference is. 
 According to cognitivists about word reference, claims about what a word refers to is 
properly to be thought of as an explicit statement of something known or believed by an 
individual speaker or group of speakers – or perhaps tacitly known or tacitly believed, since 
the knowledge may differ in one way or another from regular knowledge or belief. 
Abstracting from internecine controversies that are here unimportant, let us fix on ‘tacit 
belief’ as the label for the relevant cognitive relation, whatever its nature. On the cognitivist 
picture, overlap in what a group of language users tacitly believe about the referential 
properties of words, such as it is, contributes to the capacity each has to understand the others, 
such as it is. Talk of words referring simpliciter is loose, say cognitivists. It needs to be 
embedded in a psychological context. What words refer to independently of their being tacitly 
believed to refer, in so far as that makes any sense, is explanatorily otiose. 
 If word reference were substitution friendly in the same way that intentions are, the 
discrepancy between I and II, on which the puzzle trades, would evaporate. On the present  
construal of the ascription to words of referential properties, this promises to be the case. 
Suppose that Jane could tacitly believe the content of (1) without tacitly believing the content 
of (2). That is, suppose that (3) could hold without (4) holding. 
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(1) ‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus. 
(2) ‘Venus’ refers to Phosphorus. 
(3) Jane tacitly believes that ‘Venus’ refers to Hesperus. 
(4) Jane tacitly believes that ‘Venus’ refers to Phosphorus. 
 
Since claims like (1) and (2) are, strictly speaking, properly to be thought of as code for 
something like (3) and (4), substitution unfriendliness of tacit belief transposes into 
substitution unfriendliness of word reference. 
 This inference from cognitivism to the substitution unfriendliness of word reference is 
not so smooth as it seems. Even if an ascription of referential properties to words is code for a 
claim about some individual’s idiolect, the latter constituted out of the content of their tacit 
beliefs, it does not follow that word reference inherits the substitution unfriendliness of tacit 
belief. An analogy helps to see the non sequitur. Suppose psychologist working on the human 
visual system were to assert, casually, that lines fanning out from each end of a line make that 
line longer, while lines arrowing out from its ends make it shorter. This would be their loose 
way of saying that the human visual system perceives its environment in this way. It does not 
follow from this that the length property of lines is as substitution unfriendly as the 
perception-as relation. Patently it does not: the Müller-Lyer is an illusion. 
 Perhaps a word’s referential properties lack the objectivity of a line’s geometrical 
properties. The length of a line is an objective feature of the world. There is more to being 
15cm long than being perceived to be 15cm long. In contrast, it may be that there is nothing to 
a word’s referring other than its being believed to refer. For this reason the analogy between 
word reference and line length just used to defeat the inference from cognitivism about word 
reference to the substitution unfriendliness of word reference could be unfair. 
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 To rescue the cognitivist argument for the substitution unfriendliness of word reference 
in this way requires commitment either to extreme subjectivism about reference or to the 
believability of nonsense, even though neither is tenable. It requires both that individual 
speakers are capable of (tacitly) believing that a given word refers to such-and-such and either 
that it is meaningless to describe a word as referring simpliciter or that no distinction can be 
drawn between a word’s referring and a word’s being tacitly believed to refer. But belief 
states can be individuated from one another only if they make distinct demands on the world. 
If a belief’s content was nonsensical, or if a belief’s being held correctly amounted to no more 
than its being held, it would not be distinct from other beliefs with the same trait. All putative 
beliefs about reference would collapse into one another.
13
 What the objectivity of word 
reference amounts to, for those who think tacit beliefs about word reference are possible and 
must be objective, is a further matter. It could be a threshold likelihood that the word is or can 
be or will be used by particular speakers to refer in some way, or it could be a convention. 
Whatever answer is preferred, the strengthened form of cognitivist argument against II (and 
hence against IIA and IIB) seems flawed.
14
 
 Though it is only debatably classified as cognitivist in orientation, Jerry Fodor’s account 
of linguistic competence provides another platform for arguing that the “puzzle” is but a 
phantasm, and an opportunity to review some of the counter-arguments already offered. 
According to Fodor 1976, Ch. 3, hearing a familiar word triggers, by default, a particular 
mental representation, and with luck it triggers one that is appropriate to the occasion, i.e. one 
with the same content as that invoked by the word’s utterance. This view is often associated 
with the rejection of cognitivism about truth-conditional semantics for natural language, and 
indeed with the rejection of truth-conditional semantics for natural language tout court. But it 
does not have to be. On adopting this model of linguistic understanding one can either 
abandon the thought that speakers know a compositional truth theory or, alternatively, view 
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the model as an implementation of that very thought (see Matthews 2003 for discussion). The 
Fodorian model seems to offer a quick way with our puzzle no matter how it is classified. If it 
is a refutation of word reference (as opposed to speaker reference), including cognitivism 
about word reference, the puzzle disappears instantly: no word reference means no tension or 
inconsistency between the characteristics of word reference and the characteristic of speaker 
reference. If it is an implementation of cognitivism about word reference, in specifying what a 
word refers to we had better use words in our metalanguage that reflect the content of the 
mental representation associated with (i.e. habitually triggered or invoked by) the word. So if 
‘Venus’ triggers tokenings in Jane of (her mental representation) HESPERUS rather than of (her 
mental representation) PHOSPHORUS, we should say that in her idiolect it refers to Hesperus, 
and not that it refers to Phosphorus. In that case, word reference would be substitution 
unfriendly. 
 Responses to both strategies are implicit in what has already been said. The ‘refutation’ 
line is, in effect, a form of monism. For that reason it is susceptible to the second form of the 
puzzle, set out in section VI. The ‘implementation’ line is also susceptible to that form of the 
puzzle (since it presupposes the representationalist theory of mind) but is, in addition, 
vulnerable to the criticisms of cognitivism presented in this section. A word presumably 
inherits its referential properties from the referential properties of the mental representation 
with which it is associated. Jane may not tacitly believe that ‘Venus’ refers to Phosphorus 
(even if she does tacitly believe that it refers to Hesperus), but there is no way of blocking the 
claim that ‘Venus’ in fact refers to Phosphorus without denying either that a word refers to 
whatever the mental representation it is associated with refers to or that the mental 
representation associated with ‘Hesperus’ refers to what the mental representation associated 
with ‘Phosphorus’ refers to. Neither option is attractive. By generalizing from this instance, II 
follows: what a word refers to, even relative to an idiolect, is substitution friendly. 
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VIII. Direct versus indirect theories of reference: a disjunctive solution? 
I have been considering why a puzzle, or what I claim is a puzzle, has not been raised or taken 
seriously in this form. A fourth explanation of this phenomenon arises out of a long-standing 
debate over whether names are disguised definite descriptions, as Russell held, and so refer, if 
at all, indirectly; or whether instead they refer, if at all, directly, i.e. without the mediation of a 
description somehow associated with the name. Both sides in that debate face familiar and yet 
to be negotiated hurdles. Descriptivists need to meet the various objections set out in or 
adapted from Kripke 1980. Direct reference theorists, who often accept a commitment to 
denying substitution failure in attitude reports, need to explain away our contrary intuitions 
more convincingly than they have done so to date. All the same, the puzzle set out in various 
versions in sections III to VI, above, arguably dissolves once one accepts that at least one of 
the two sides is, in some form, correct. 
 How promising is this disjunctive stance? Arguing against it is not easy. The 
descriptivist/anti-descriptivist debate has spawned logically connected but self-sustaining 
disputes concerning attitude reports, modality, quotation, referential and attributive uses of 
definite descriptions, internalism versus externalism about both linguistic and mental content, 
information-theoretic versus conceptual-role semantics in the philosophy of mind, and so on. 
Inevitably this has given rise to a dense spectrum of views in place of the simple dichotomy 
of lore. A further question is pressing in the present context: which positions are addressing 
the question of how words refer (i.e. directly or indirectly), and which are addressing the 
question of how speakers refer? Taking each view in turn and seeing if and how it 
circumvents the puzzle would be an unrealistic goal in this paper. The simplest way of 
accommodating the profusion of theories would be for me to hand the puzzle over to you, the 
reader, by asking you to choose for yourself which from among the five assumptions that give 
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rise to the inconsistency in V you would like to reject, given your theoretical commitments in 
this area, and then to ask you to repeat the performance for the asterisked version of the 
inconsistency in VI. Rather than washing my hands entirely, though, I will persist with the 
pretence and offer some reasons to think that, in fact, neither of the two dominant views 
generates an uncomplicated solution to the puzzle. 
 Many direct reference theorists will look askance at IB. Their view is associated with 
attempts to show, precisely, that if Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly then, 
appearances notwithstanding, she believes that Clark Kent can fly. What goes for believing 
goes for intending, with the result that if Jane, in uttering ‘Venus’, intends in so doing to be 
taken as referring to Hesperus, she also intends in so doing to be taken as referring to 
Phosphorus. The hope is that the contrary appearance can be explained away as a pragmatic 
effect. 
 There is something dialectically peculiar about direct reference theorists appealing to 
the substitution friendliness of the attitudes to see off the puzzle that is my main concern in 
this paper. Substitution friendliness is not a felicitous corollary of the direct reference 
perspective. Rather, it is a controversial lemma that needs to be argued for if one particular 
strategy for coping with a serious embarrassment for the perspective is to succeed. To see 
this, notice that unhappiness with descriptivism (for independent reasons such as those in 
Kripke 1980) does not make the reasons people were initially attracted to descriptivism go 
away. Among these reasons is the ease with which descriptivists seem able to cope with the 
apparent substitution unfriendliness of the attitudes. Direct reference theorists need to show 
either that the appearance of substitution failure is deceptive (so that descriptivist accounts of 
substitution failure, even if they work, are redundant), that directness of reference is in fact 
compatible with substitution unfriendliness (so that descriptivists are not the only ones able to 
account for it), or that substitution unfriendliness is a problem that arises independently of any 
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commitment to directness of reference (so that both direct and indirect reference theorists are 
on an equal footing – see e.g. Kripke 1979). The second and third strategies, for all that they 
succeed in the dispute between direct and indirect theorists of reference, can be pursued 
without rejecting IB. Only the first strategy calls for rejection of IB. But its rejection is a 
burden, not a part of the theory. Against this background, rejecting IB because one has a 
direct-reference badge on one’s lapel would be like appealing the possibility of causal 
overdetermination because one is a Cartesian dualist. Cartesians should worry about causal 
overdetermination, not make free appeal to it. Certainly, eye-rolling at the obviousness of the 
proper solution to the puzzle would be premature before the falsehood of Ib is established on 
a more secure independent footing than it has been.
15
 
 A further complication is that taking psychological attitudes to be substitution friendly 
with a view to making speaker reference substitution friendly may have unwelcome side-
effects. In the definition of speaker reference, the name for the referent is doubly-embedded 
within attitude verbs. For speaker reference to be substitution friendly, both ‘intends’ and 
‘think’ need to be substitution friendly. But now suppose that Lois Lane’s friend, Mandy, 
utters ‘Clark Kent is a superhero’ to her. Mandy is fully aware of the identity, but she assumes 
that Lois is ignorant. In performing this utterance, she is in no way intent on letting Lois in on 
Clark’s secret. She wishes merely to suggest that Lois should stop being so demanding of 
potential suitors, and to induce in her a belief that Clark is a superhero in, so to speak, a 
metrosexual kind of a way. To make sense of Mandy’s utterance it is hard to avoid supposing 
that in uttering ‘Clark Kent’ she intends her action to be thought of as a reference to Clark 
Kent but that she does not intend her action to be thought of as a reference to Superman. 
Making intending and judging substitution friendly in order to make speaker reference 
substitution friendly sabotages this appealing description of Mandy’s psychological profile. 
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 What about indirect theories of reference? The nature of the descriptivist response to the 
puzzle will vary according to the nature of the descriptivism. Let us say that all forms of 
descriptivism treat an ordinary name, ‘Venus’ for example, as a definite description in 
disguise – ‘the V’, say, for some predicate ‘V’. Sentences containing ‘Venus’ will therefore 
be true if, and only if, there is exactly one salient satisfier of ‘V’ and that satisfier meets the 
condition imposed by the semantics for the rest of the sentence. Strong descriptivists go 
further in saying, with Russell, that the definite description – and hence the name – lacks 
meaning in isolation. Russell’s thought, here, is that, although the function of a name (and, 
indeed, of an explicit definite description) appears to be that of referring to an object in order 
that some property may then be attributed to that object by predication, the appearance is 
misleading. Since names do not refer, the “puzzle” of section III evaporates. 
 Weak descriptivists agree with strong descriptivists that names and definite descriptions 
fail to refer to simple entities in the world, but allow that they refer to something, for example 
to generalized quantifiers. Once again the puzzle disappears. ‘Venus’ refers, not to a planet, 
but to a complex abstract object. Moreover, generalized quantifiers can be discriminated as 
finely as the properties expressible in a description, so replacing ‘V’ in ‘the V’ with co-
extensive ‘V*’ would change the referent. As a result, no name can have a referent that the 
speaker fails to appreciate is its referent, and no contradiction along the lines of the proof in 
section V will be possible. 
  While the puzzle about speaker reference and word reference gets no grip here, a 
simple variation on it is easy to construct, based on the notion of denotation in place of 
reference. An object a is denoted by a definite description ‘the A’, or by a name that disguises 
such a definite description, if and only if there is exactly one entity with the property 
expressed by ‘A’, and a is it, i.e. if and only if ‘the A’ refers to a generalized quantifier that 
determines a. Word denotation is substitution friendly. Speaker denotation seems not to be. 
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Suppose Jane, in uttering ‘Venus’, denotes Hesperus. Does it follow that she has denoted 
Phosphorus? It does not, if denotation is defined in the illocutionary fashion (so that what a 
speaker denotes is a matter of what she intends to be thought of as having denoted – see 
section III). Speaker denotation is a difficult notion for descriptivists, weak or strong, to do 
without, since they must appeal to it in accounting for the appearance of a distinction between 
referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. But admitting it threatens to re-
introduce the puzzle by the back door. 
 
IX. The puzzle solved 
I have been arguing for the existence of, and explaining the failure to take seriously or even 
notice, a puzzle facing anyone who accepts a number of assumptions. The assumptions are 
that speaker reference is detemined by the speaker’s intention (perhaps those of the form of 
IA), that psychological attitudes permit substitution failure (IB), that a change in the referential 
properties of a word alters the truth conditions of all sentences in which it appears (IIB), that 
truth conditions are substitution friendly (IIA), and that, normally, to refer to something it is 
necessary and sufficient to use a word that refers to that thing (III) – or else the asterisked 
versions of IIA, IIB, and III for those who are sceptical of word reference but not of mental-
representation reference. The challenge has been to show that a puzzle exists. Once it is 
acknowledged, a solution invites itself: change IA. More specifically, introduce an existential 
quantifier – an extensionalizing existential – into the formulation of the intention that 
constitutes a speaker’s referring. 
 Let IA’ be the generalization of which the following is a particular instance: 
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Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus if and only if x(x = Hesperus & Jane’s intention 
in uttering the word is that her audience should think of her doing so as a reference to 
x). 
 
This modification (the quantifier plus the identity-conjunct) renders the choice of 
metalinguistic term used to identify the referent less demanding, and so solves the puzzles 
instantly: speaker reference is no longer substitution unfriendly, notwithstanding intending’s 
substitution unfriendliness. The proof of this, below, is long but straightforward – apart, 
perhaps, from the step to SC6. It shows how, given IA’ and the identity of Hesperus with 
Phosphorus, if Jane is referring to Hesperus when she uses ‘Venus’, she must equally be 
referring to Phosphorus. 
 
P1 Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus. 
P2 Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Hesperus iff x(x = Hesperus & her intention in 
uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience should think of her doing so as a reference to 
x). [Instance of IA’] 
SC1 x(x = Hesperus & Jane’s intention in uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience should 
think of her doing so as a reference to x). [From P1, P2] 
P3 c = Hesperus & Jane’s intention in uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience should 
think of her doing so as a reference to c. [Assumption, discharged at SC7] 
SC2 c = Hesperus. [From P3] 
P4 Hesperus = Phosphorus. 
SC3 c = Phosphorus. [From SC2, P4] 
SC4 Jane’s intention in uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience should think of her doing 
so as a reference to c. [From P3] 
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SC5 c = Phosphorus & Jane’s intention in uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience should 
think of her doing so as a reference to c. [From SC3, SC4] 
SC6 x(x = Phosphorus & Jane’s intention in uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience 
should think of her doing so as a reference to x). [From SC5] 
SC7 x(x = Phosphorus & Jane’s intention in uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience 
should think of her doing so as a reference to x). [From SC1, P3, and SC6 by E] 
P5 Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Phosphorus iff x(x = Phosphorus & Jane’s intention 
in uttering ‘Venus’ is that her audience should think of her doing so as a reference 
to x). [Instance of IA’] 
C Jane uses ‘Venus’ to refer to Phosphorus. [From SC7, P5] 
 
SC6 uses existential generalization on a term that lies inside the scope of a psychological 
attitude verb. The worry is that this is no less objectionable than substituting within such a 
context. But the existential generalization at SC6 is immunized against the opacity of 
‘intends’ by the identity claim in SC5, in which ‘c’ occurs in a non-opaque context.16 
 This points to a different objection to IA, sidelined since my decision at the beginning of 
section III to focus on just one half of the notion of intentionality. The right-hand side of IA 
does not contain a commitment to the existence of the referent but its left-hand side does. A 
puzzle similar to the one I have been concentrating on can be mounted on the following 
contrast: 
 
I: Speaker reference is not existentially committed. 
II: Word reference is existentially committed. 
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That speaker reference is existentially non-committed follows from IA and IB, a cousin of IB. 
 
IB: Intending is not existentially committed (e.g. someone could intend to touch Santa 
Claus). 
 
That word reference is existentially committed follows from acceptance of logical inferences 
such as existential generalization even in benign contexts: 
 
 ‘John is tall’ is true 
 ‘Something is tall’ is true 
 
This puzzle vanishes once IA’ is adopted in place of IA. IA’, unlike IA, requires the referent to 
exist. It is simply not possible for a person to refer to a non-existent. A person can still 
attempt to refer to Santa Claus, of course. To attempt to refer to Santa Claus is to attempt to 
bring it about that there is some entity, x, such that x is Santa Claus and one’s audience 
recognizes one’s utterance of the word ‘Santa’ as a reference to x. Attempting’s lack of 
existential import makes Santa’s non-existence harmless. When we say of someone, 
colloquially, that they referred to Santa Claus (or any other non-existent being, fictional or 
otherwise), we are really saying that they attempted, or perhaps feigned to attempt, to refer to 
Santa Claus. 
 I conclude, then, that accounts of speaker reference can remain intention-based without 
our having either to make word-reference substitution unfriendly or to give up on the 
intentionality of the attitudes. Showing this has not been hard. It required only the 
introduction of what I called an extensionalizing existential. Most of the work in this paper 
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1
 Davis 2005 seems to take seriously what it is ‘natural’ to say about what a person has referred to; and Chomsky 
2003: 272, citing Strawson, writes that whereas talk of speakers referring is ‘normal in English (with 
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counterparts in other languages)’, talk of words referring is ‘a technical innovation that remains obscure and 
unexplained’, and infers from this that ‘[t]hose who believe that some notion of “word-thing reference”’ has an 
explanatory role ‘have to explain what they mean, and provide the evidence’. 
2
 Thus, Kripke’s distinction is designed to call into question Donnellan’s criticism of Russell’s account of 
definite descriptions, while Quine’s claim is driven, presumably, by a concern with logical relations whose study 
has traditionally involved the interpretation of the elements of formal languages. 
3
 Compare Strawson 1950: 333. One might accept this point but still see in Russell’s theory the seeds of a useful 
explanation of our capacity to think about non-existent objects. In that case, his theory of descriptions would feed 
into a theory of mental content, not linguistic content, and be relevant to attempts to refer or to avoid that fail 
through the lack of an object. 
4
 I will follow a policy throughout of illustrating IA, etc., using instances rather than expressing them as 
generalizations. Generalizations would need to be expressed schematically rather than using objectual 
quantification into the complement clause of psychological operators, and using schematic generalization does 
not illuminate anything. 
5
 The reasons for this are similar to the reasons for why beliefs must not be true merely because they are held – 
something I argue for explicitly in section VII. 
6
 The version of the proof below, thought still informal, is detailed enough to reveal how the contribution of IIa 
distributes out into uncontroversial uses of Hypothetical Syllogism and the Law of Identity (see main text). 
Moreover, the contribution of IIb dissolves in to the re-use of the background semantics for the rest of the 
sentence (i.e. P2, as used in going from SC3 to Conc.). 
P1. ‘Venus’ refers Hesperus. 
P2. [Semantics for ‘Venus is wet’ minus P1]  
SC1. ‘Venus is wet’ is true iff Hesperus is wet. (From P1, P2) 
P3. Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
SC2. Hesperus is wet iff Phosphorus is wet. (From P3 using the Law of Identity uncontroversially.) 
SC3. ‘Venus is wet’ is true iff Phosphorus is wet. (From SC1 & SC2, in an uncontroversial use of HS ) 
Conc.‘Venus’ refers to Phosphorus. (From SC3, P2) 
 41 
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 The fallback position I am urging against here is more clearly problematic in the version of the puzzle that 
figures in section VI. It is difficult to see how a speaker could use a word referringly without using it to refer to 
what the mental representation they thereby invoke refers. (See the next section for a definition of ‘invoke’.) 
8
 Whether the relation is in fact four-place – a speakerI
 
 using a wordII to refer some audienceIII to an objectIV – is 
not a pressing issue here. My own view is that the actual existence of an audience is unnecessary. What matters 
is that the speaker thinks there is an audience, since only then can he or she form the intention to have that 
audience think of the act as a reference to the object. A similar line cannot be taken on the existence of the 
object. One cannot refer save to something that really exists. I touch on this in section IX. 
9
 There is a question over the nature of the shorthand. It is hardly synecdoche or metonymy. ‘The (hired) gun 
killed the child’ in a Raymond Chandler novel means that the person carrying the gun killed the child; but while 
the NRA slogan may be confused, it is not so confused as to be saying that people don’t kill people, people kill 
people. The shorthand is more plausibly seen as a form of ellipsis. The criticism I offer of the ‘shorthand’ 
position is neutral on how it is developed. 
10
 One line to take with a voluntarist about belief is to challenge them to form the belief that there is a human-
sized pigeon behind them; if they claim to have met the challenge, bet them €1,000 that there is no such pigeon. 
By refusing they will be implicitly conceding the argument. Were they to accept, you would at least end up a 
little wealthier. In an evolutionary context, the latter outcome would be equivalent to them being at a 
reproductive disadvantage. 
11
 For more on constraints on intention formation, see Bratman 1987; for more on doxastic anti-voluntarism see 
Ginet 2001. 
12
 It is not clear, for example, whether the anti-monist argument requires an information-theoretic theory of 
content of the kind criticised by McGilvray (echoing Chomsky) in the quotation in section I rather than, say, a 
more interpretationist semantics such as that apparently endorsed in Chomsky 2000: 160, and more familiarly 
associated with Daniel Dennett. 
13
 Similarly, states of intending are distinct only if acting on them successfully requires distinct outcomes. This is 
why referring cannot be a matter of intending to refer to it. See section III and the discussion of Ib. 
14
 For an explicit if slightly dated exchange on the believability of nonsense, see the exchange between Avrum 
Stroll 1953; 1955 and W. W. Mellor 1954. François Recanati 1997 allows that nonsense can be believed, but 
predicates this possibility on the believer hearing and deferring to a speaker without realizing that the words 
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coming out of the latter’s mouth have no content. Whatever its merits, applying this explanation in the present 
context would mean treating all tacit belief about reference as parasitic on explicit talk about reference. This 
would fail to explain how people sheltered from such explicit talk may nevertheless be linguistically competent. 
15
 As it happens, the first strategy, when it has been followed, has led to a theory that resembles the solution 
offered to the puzzle in section IX, even though this latter does not involve rejecting IB. According to Salmon 
1986, the belief relation, which is a two place relation, is derivative of a three-place relation, BEL(…), which 
holds between a person, a Russellian proposition, and one of that proposition’s guises. S believes that p if and 
only if x(BEL(S, p, x). Believes is therefore insensitive to the choice among distinct but co-referring terms to 
pick out its relata, but the choice of word pragmatically implicates a particular guise. Whether this use of (what I 
will call) an extensionalizing existential succeeds is a moot point, but it is possible to use a similar sounding 
strategy to make speaker reference substitution friendly without rejecting IB (and without quantifying over 
guises). 
16
 In earlier versions of the paper I experimented with using substitutional quantification to avoid the worry. I 
now think that on balance an objectual treatment is adequate, and avoids the need to confront anxieties about 
both substitutional quantification per se (see Kripke 1976) and ‘metalinguistic’ approaches to opacity (see Saul 
1996). Worth noting is that Searle 1969 includes a substitutionally interpreted existential quantifier in his ‘rules 
of reference’ (pp. 94-6; the interpretation of the quantifier is discussed on p. 94). This seems designed to block 
existential failure (to be discussed below in the main text) rather than substitutional failure, as his rules lack 
anything equivalent to the ‘x = Hesperus’, and remarks on pp. 89-90 indicate reluctance to include one. Indeed, 
he steers around the puzzle by defining (the equivalent of) ‘Jane refers’ rather than ‘Jane refers to Hesperus’. In 
the preliminaries to the rules, he assimilates puzzles about substitution to what I earlier called II’  (pp. 79, 90-1) 
and an ‘axiom of identification’ (p. 80). Of course, his account could be adapted. My emphasis has been on 
failure to spot the puzzle, not on the difficulty of making changes to cope with it once it is spotted. 
17
 This paper has evolved out of talks with the same title at (in chronological order) the Proper Names workshop 
at the Humboldt Institute in Berlin, the philosophy departments of Sussex University, Birmingham University, 
and the Open University, the Pragmatics conference in Riva del Garda, the Canadian Philosophical Association 
at the University of Western Ontario, the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association in 
Southampton, and the Philosophy of Linguistics workshop at the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik. My 
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